International Conflict 

“(Nuclear) Change of Plans: What Explains Nuclear Reversals?” with Benjamin T. Jones  International Interactions, 42.3 (2016): 530--585. DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1115760
                                                                                            
“Explaining Volatile Foreign Policy Behavior” (Under Review)
When we think of states' foreign policy behavior, we focus on explaining either cooperation (i.e., treaty signing, IO joining, etc.)  or conflict (i.e. dispute initiation, crisis recurrence, etc.). Yet states often engage in both types of behavior, in self-defeating ways. I propose a theory of volatile foreign policy behavior, which I test with original data.

“The Domestic Determinants of US Counter Proliferation Policy Through Time” (Under Review)
This paper theorizes the conditions under which the US decides to rely on both carrots and sticks in its counterproliferation policy, arguing that the roots of this portfolio diversification are to be found in its domestic politics.

Civil Wars

“A Manifesto, in 140 Characters or Fewer: Social Media as a Tool of Rebel Diplomacy in the Libyan Civil War” with Benjamin T. Jones, First View, British Journal of Political Science. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123416000612  
 
“Food Scarcity and State Vulnerability: Unpacking the Link Between Climate Variability and Violent Unrest” 
with Bear F. Braumoeller and BenjaminT. Jones , Journal of Peace Research, 54.3 (2017): 335--350.  DOI: 10.1177/0022343316684662

Featured on:
Benjamin T. Jones, Eleonora Mattiacci, and Bear F. Braumoeller "Food Violence Shows Need for Both Development and Climate Resilience,"  NewSecurityBeat Blog, May 31,2017 .   
United Press International, "Studies predict where global warming is likely to spark violence." Friday June 9, 2017.

 

“The Shifting Strategies of State Diplomacy”  with Benjamin T. Jones (Under Review)

The form that state diplomacy takes during a civil war (e.g., sending diplomats abroad, using social media, speaking to the international press, etc.) is a function of strategic calculations based on the interaction between the ability to finance the rebel organization on the one hand and the course of the conflict on the other.